Abstract
Introduction
The construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) has been presented by the EU Commission and the ECB and a number of economists and economic thinktanks as a crucial pillar to the construction of Banking Union (Wolff 2016; IMF 2013a) . For many, it is unlikely that an EDIS would ever have to be called upon, due to the existence of a system for sharing risk should be sufficient to build depositor (and investor) confidence in national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) and, consequently, national banks (Wolff 2016) . 1 Despite this confidence, a number of euro area member states -led above all by Germany -expressed strong opposition to the creation of an EDIS.
This paper explains why the creation of an EDIS has been so particularly challenging.
First, there was concern regarding the financial imposition upon banks of healthier 1 More specifically, the inclusion of depositor preference in the EU's 2014 Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) means that depositors will only become part of the bank's bail-in if bank losses are very large and claims by more junior creditors are insufficient to fill the gap or if financial stability concerns impose losses on other creditors above those implied by the need to resolve the problem at minimum cost.
3 national banking systems -first and foremost Germany -which would have to make a contribution to the EDIS. This commitment to potential financial transfer via the banking system as opposed to the public purse -was politically unpalatable for policy-makers in these countries. Second, there was the perception of moral hazard highlighted repeatedly by the German finance minister, concerning the manageability of real and possible bank losses. However, this article focuses upon another explanatory factor of national preferences on the EDIS: the different configuration of existing national DGS. Different national DGS were in turn linked to the different configuration of national banking systems. Different DGS configuration directed both national policy on the difficult revision of the DGS directive and emphasis placed upon moral hazard in the formation of national preferences on the EDIS.
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This paper contributes to four main bodies of scholarly literature. First, it adds to a small but growing political economy literature on financial systems -starting with Zysman's (1983) pioneering work, followed by Allen & Gale (2000) , Busch (2009) , Deeg (1999; 2010) , Hardie & Howarth (2013) and Hardie et al. (2013) which engage in a comparative analysis of financial (or specifically banking) systems. Second, the 2 The focus on banking system and DGS configuration as the main explanatory factor of national preferences does not deny the importance of the legal disagreements to the eventual construction of the EDIS. The EU Commission, the ECB and a number of member states argued that EDIS was an extension of EU policies to foster economic integration and that the EDIS's legal basis was therefore Article 114 TFEU. Germany and a number of other member states argued that the EDIS would be a new European financial instrument and thus required Treaty change to adopt. Changing the Treaty required a unanimous vote, thus giving Germany the power to veto any proposal.
paper contributes to the comparative political economy literature on Varieties of
Capitalism and the financial and sovereign debt crisis (Hall 2014 ) and specifically national banking systems and the recent crises (Hardie & Howarth 2013; Quaglia & Howarth 2013 ) by examining how the specific features of national banking systems directed government preferences on both national DGS, the EU DGS directive and the EDIS. Third, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on the politics and political economy of Banking Union (Donnelly 2014; Howarth & Quaglia 2013 Schimmelfennig 2016; Salines et al. 2012 , Spendzharova 2014 ) which feeds into the vast literature on EMU and European economic governance, more generally, and national preference formation on EMU, more specifically (for example, Dyson 2000; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Verdun 2000; Walsh 2000) . Fourth, this paper contributes to the literature on deposit guarantee schemes dominated by financial economists and legal scholars (Ayadi & Lastra 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005 Bernet & Walter 2009 ).
This paper is organised as follows. We first summarise the main functions and feature of DGS and EU legislation on DGS, prior to its 2014 reform. Second, we summarise the progress of discussion on the EDIS. Third, we examine the main rationalist and moral hazard arguments presented by a number of EU member states to explain opposition to the creation of a pan-EU or euro area / Banking Union scheme. Fourth, this paper presents the main features of existing DGS in six member states which reflect the structure of national banking system. Existing DGS in turn shaped national preferences on the revision of the DGS directive and the creation of a pan-EU scheme -the subject of the fifth section.
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The main functions and features of deposit guarantee schemes
Most of the world's wealthier countries had statutory DGS schemes prior to the 1990s, while some also had voluntary schemes (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005 ex ante by collecting premiums on a scheduled basis, others did that ex post from surviving institutions once a bank has failed. Some countries had contingency plans in the case of a shortfall of funds to cover deposits that included government support (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005 . Some DGS used different measures to calculate the premiums for different banks so as to take into account the level of risk.
Domestic banks were covered by the DGS, but not necessarily subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks. In the EU, deposits in foreign branches were covered by the home-country DGS and deposits in foreign subsidiaries were covered by the hostcountry DGS (IMF 2013b A pan-European scheme: on the agenda and off again
As early as July 2010, as part of its legislative proposal to amend the DGS directive, and the resolution fund could be set up under the control of a common resolution authority. Such a framework would greatly reduce the need to make actual use of the guarantee scheme. Nevertheless, the credibility of any deposit guarantee scheme requires access to a solid financial backstop.
Therefore, as regards the euro area, the European Stability Mechanism could act as the fiscal backstop to the resolution and deposit guarantee authority (p. 4).
A deposit insurance scheme provides protection to bank depositors, reimbursing the deposits of clients of a failed bank up to a certain amount. It is designed to prevent a 'bank run' -that is, panic withdrawals by customers of their bank deposits because of fear of collapse. In so doing, it also supports the overall stability of the financial However, the most explicit presentation of moral hazard concerns to justify opposition to the creation of an EDIS came from the German government. German opposition to the EDIS paralleled its reluctance on the creation of the three other pillars of Banking Union (Howarth & Quaglia 2016 ensures problems' and pointed to the wrong incentives and rising stability risks for agreement rather than EU legislation in order to ensure the maintenance of national control over the use of SRF funds to supplement national resolution funding in the resolution of banks. The creation of the EDIS however implied automatic access to European funds to cover insured deposits in the event of exhaustion of national DGS funds.
14 both national governments and banks that such a scheme would create. In September 2015, the German government produced a non-paper which pointed out several necessary steps forward to make Banking Union a success, without mentioning an EDIS (Federal Government 2015) . Despite this strident opposition, the European Commission published its draft directive in November 2015.
By contrast, France and euro area periphery countries regarded an EDIS as the final pillar of Banking Union, necessary to sever the doom loop between banks and sovereigns, preventing deposit flights in countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis (Reuters, 11 September 2015) . For example, the Italian authorities repeatedly pointed out that the SSM should be complemented by a SRM and an EDIS because 'coherence was needed between the centralisation of supervision and the management of financial difficulties' in order to achieve the objectives of Banking Union (Szego, 2013: 7, authors' translation) . Similarly, the Spanish government emphasized the need to agree the basis and the date for the EDIS to complete Banking Union (Rajoy 2013).
However, prior to mid-2015, these countries focused their efforts on the creation of the SRM (and SRF) (Saccomanni 2013), on which there was a proposal under negotiation -rather than lobby for an EDIS, which was seen as a lost battle.
National preferences and divergent DGS across the EU
In Europe, most national DGS were set up as a consequence of a series of banking failures in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although some countries, for example Germany, had set up their system earlier. 4 In 1994, the EU issued the DGS directive, which was based on minimum harmonization. The directive also established harmonized rules concerning the compulsory participation of branches of non-EU banks in national DGS in the host country and the non-participation of branches of EU banks in national DGS in the host country, unless they sought to opt in with the aim of obtaining extra coverage. However, member state implementation of the directive was largely undertaken in ways that were suitable to national banking systems and the existing national DGS. Hence, the national DGS remained distinctive (see Garcia and Prast 2003; 2004) . Table 1 summarises the main differences among national banking systems and among the national DGS.
Germany
The Prior to the implementation of the revised DGS directive agreed in late 2014, the FGDR was limited in relation to the total amount of covered deposits. The Fund took the view that resolution of a systemically important French bank would not lead to a pay-out to indemnify depositor claims, but rather to resolution measures -for instance, facilitating a sale of some assets and liabilities (FGDR 2015) . This requirement of selling off assets (rather than raising the deposit cover provided) was a reflection of the large size of the biggest French banks, which were better positioned to sell off assets, than, for example, small German banks. Financial support from the FGDR could be used either for compensation to depositors or for recovery actions in order to prevent the disorderly failure of a bank. This financial support was not subject to an explicit 'least cost' criterion -whether the cost of providing financial support was likely to be lower or higher than that of a pay-out to depositors in liquidation.
However, in practice, a 'least cost' consideration was seen as inevitably shaping Fund decisions (IMF 2012b).
The Netherlands
The Dutch DGS, the Collective Guarantee Scheme, was established in 1978 and existed until reforms in mid-2013 designed to implement the revised DGS directive (Garcia and Prast 2003) . Similar to France, the design of the scheme reflects the highly concentration of the Dutch (retail) banking system. The Scheme was funded ex post (through a 'pay-box' system) and in the event that available funds were insufficient for the full coverage of insured deposits, public authorities were not explicitly authorized to provide additional funding. As in France, insured depositors were not given priority right over shareholders. Ex-post assessments were made case-by-case based on several items of data reported to the central bank. The contribution amounts were determined after consultation with the Bankers' Committee. Only deposits of small enterprises, small foundations, and households were protected. The coverage limits were €20,000 The two sectoral schemes were primarily entrusted with depositor pay-out in the context of bank liquidation, but had a broad mandate to provide guarantees, credits, acquire equity and fund purchase and assumption transactions (which concern resolution), provided that they were less costly than a pay-out. Such interventions were 
The UK
The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) was independent of both government and the financial industry but accountable to the Prudential Regulatory Authority of the Bank of England (and prior to 2012, the independent Financial Supervisory Authority). The FSCS managed five protection schemes for different categories of customers, one of those being insured depositors in deposit-taking institutions (IMF 2011a). As in France, there were no distinct schemes for specific categories of banks, reflecting the domination of the national retail banking market by a small number of institutions. Also, reflecting the high concentration in retail banking, the scheme for insured depositors was ex post funded in that when it incurred costs, the member banks would be required to cover these costs on a pro-rata basis (a share of protected deposits up to the compensation limit per individual depositor per authorized bank). In a pay-out situation, the FSCS also had unlimited access to borrow from the National Loans Fund administered by the Treasury with the accounts maintained at the Bank of England. Thus, unlike the euro area member state DGS, the FSCS had a fiscal backstop, as with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United States.
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FSCS funds could be used to: pay-out to depositors if a bank failed; finance the transfer of insured deposits to another institution under the bank insolvency procedure;
and, using the Scheme's stabilization powers, contribute to a non-payout resolution of a failed bank. In this last case, the FSCS could only act upon the order of the UK Treasury and intervention had to be based on the 'least cost' option (IMF 2011a). In the context of bank resolution, the FSCS ranked pari passu with unsecured creditors.
As in France and the Netherlands (and a number of other EU member states), the UK did not have official depositor preference prior to the finalization of the DGS directive in June 2014 -that is, the FSCS did not give depositors a preferential ranking in insolvency (PRA 2014). However, the Bank of England's Special Resolution
Regime's tools and powers were expected to be used so as to achieve a similar outcome to depositor preference. All banks were required to have account systems allowing a 'single depositor view' -i.e., that all deposits pertaining to a depositor could be easily summed up and presented in a list (IMF 2011a).
Negotiating the revised DGS directive
The DGS directive of 1994 set the minimum level of deposit protection schemes in the EU at €20,000 per depositor. However, as the 1994 directive was based on minimum harmonization, national deposit guarantee schemes continued to differ in several important respects, such as the definition of eligible deposits, the level of cover, the types of funding mechanism and the calculation of bank contributions. The global financial crisis that accelerated in late 2008 brought into the spotlight the inadequacy of the 1994 directive (Ayadi & Lastra 2010) .
To begin with, the minimum level (€20,000) was considered by many to be too low to placate fears of a bank run, especially given that a number of member states provided a considerably higher legal minimum (Ayadi & Lastra 2010) . Deposit protection coverage varied markedly across the EU, ranging from the legal minimum in most of the new member states and the UK to more than €100,000 in Italy and France. -represented an emergency measure designed to restore depositors' confidence by raising the minimum level of coverage for deposits from €20,000 to, initially, €50,000
and subsequently to €100,000. The need for swift action meant that several controversial issues were not tackled and hence the directive contained a clause providing for a broad review of all aspects of deposit guarantee schemes. By 2010, schemes continued to vary markedly across the member states and only 16 out of 27 applied the coverage level of €100,000, or had legislation in place to do so German commercial, savings banks and cooperative banks, which each had their own sector-specific institutional protection schemes which also provided funds for deposit guarantees, opposed the Commission's proposal because they feared that they would be forced to establish a second fund based on ensuring deposits (Donnelly 2014) . banks would be liquidated using the DGS -rather they would be resolved (Commission 2014) . This was a concession to the Netherlands, with its highly concentrated banking system, as well as to France, with its five very large banks (Bloomberg, 18 December 2013) .
In order to appease those member states with ex post payment systems -notably the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands -the revised directive envisaged the possibility of 'payment commitments' of a bank towards a DGS fully collateralized by low risk assets. The total share of payment commitments was not to exceed 30 per cent of total DGS funds. In order to appease countries such as the UK that had adopted bank levies 29 in the aftermath of the international financial crisis, member states were allowed to consider bank levies as equivalent to ex ante funds.
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In order to cater for the needs of sectoral protection schemes in place in Germany and Austria, the revised directive gave them the choice of being officially recognized as a DGS (and thus be subject to all provisions of the DGS directive), or they could continue their activity as purely institutional protection schemes. In the latter case, they would not be subject to the directive, but member banks would have to also contribute to an official DGS in that member state. In order to appease banks that were members of voluntary sectoral schemes, their lower risk linked to mutual protection could be taken into account when risk-based contributions to DGS were calculated.
The contributions to DGS were to be based on the amount of covered deposits and the degree of risk incurred by the respective bank member. Member states could set lower contributions for low-risk sectors governed by national law. In order to ensure consistent application of the DGS directive in member states, the European Banking Authority (EBA) was to issue guidelines to specify methods for calculating the contributions to DGS. These guidelines were published in May 2015 (EBA 2015) . In its 'feedback on the public consultation' (pp. 66ff), the EBA noted that respondents supported the mandatory ex ante collection of contributions on the grounds that this would work to strengthen confidence in DGS across EU member states. 5 The term 'bank levies' refers to, for example, the mandatory contributions paid by banks to the State budget for the purpose of covering the costs related to systemic risk, failure, and resolution of institutions.
However, the EBA also noted the importance that respondents placed upon flexibility, 'due to the variety of national banking structures throughout the Union ' (2015: 66) .
The EBA 'acknowledge[d] the difficulty of developing a methodology which [would] cater for the specific features of banking structures of all Member States' (2015: 66).
There was also concern that the EBA guidelines would not allow sufficient flexibility for voluntary sectoral protection schemes (as for German savings banks) since the formula for the guidelines were based predominately on covered deposits. The EBA (2015) responded by promising further modification to the guidelines so that they would be amended to take into account important features of institutional protection schemes (for example, their business model and risk profile).
In 2015, there were ongoing debates as to the composition of EU-wide core risk indicators which were to determine bank contributions to DGS. Differing bank and government positions stemmed from bank business models and structural differences in national banking systems and / or different regulatory and supervisory practice. The absence of a universal definition of the nonperforming loan ratio was seen as a major problem that could undermine harmonized implementation. The EBA had initially proposed a non-risk weighted leverage ratio (in addition to risk-weighted measures).
However, several member state governments and numerous banks criticized this proposal, especially given that the introduction of a non-risk weighted leverage ratio would disadvantage undercapitalized banks and notably alternative banks that did not issue equity, thus hitting different EU banking systems unevenly -notably, Germany more and the UK less. There were similar debates on the respective merits of Return on Assets measures (adopted by the EBA) -which might disfavour alternative banks -versus Return on Equity. It was also argued that using risk-weight assets would favour banks that used the Internal Ratings Based (IRB)-approach and disfavour banks that use the standardized approach when calculating risk-weight assets (EBA 2015: 67) . In each case, the precise standard adopted would have significant effect upon the contributions of individual banks and member state banking systems more generally.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the principal missing component of Banking Union. The Journalistic reporting on German preferences on the EDIS has stressed moral hazard concerns and the feared imposition of costs upon banks in healthier banking systems, and ultimately the manageability of real and potential bank losses. Ostensibly, in countries with ailing banking systems, the risk of having to resolve banks by resorting to resolution funds and national DGS was much higher than in countries with healthier banks. For Germany the poor state of public finances in the euro area periphery also increased the likelihood that the costs of resolving ailing banks would have to be mutualized and born by all the euro area member states, not just by the home country.
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However, this paper also presents the argument that national preferences on the EDIS, were determined largely by the structure of existing national DGS, which in turn were closely linked to the configuration of national banking systems. All this made EU negotiations on both the revised DGS and the EDIS difficult. The German (etc.) government's moral hazard concerns also stemmed from the fear that a number of member states would have difficulty meeting the target level for ex ante contributions from banks to national DGS agreed in the 2014 revised directive. The German government feared pressure to construct an EDIS even though some member states had very little in the way of ex ante funds. For the German government, the potential for moral hazard for both depositors, banks and governments in euro periphery countries was clear.
The German government was also in effect opposed to imposing a potential burden upon the joint liability schemes of small German (etc.) alternative banks to support the DGS in other member states, and thus to fund depositors of potentially large banks.
The importance of banking system structure also becomes clear in the European Commission's efforts to diminish German opposition to the EDIS. The Commission proposed that savings and cooperative banks be made exempt from having to contribute to the EDIS (Reuters, 2 November 2015). Commission President Juncker argued that it was 'people who did not follow the virtues of a social market economy' who caused the financial crisis and that savings banks and cooperative banks were not to blame (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 November 2015). However, this concession did not result in a shift in German policy, given ongoing concerns about the funding arrangements of DGS in a number of euro area member states.
This political economy analysis contributes to the growing body of academic literature on Banking Union by explaining national preferences on both the revised DGS directive and the EDIS. These preferences are derived not only from the overall health of national banking systems. They also reflect the structure of national banking systems and pre-existing national DGS. Despite more than sixty years of financial integration in the EU and significant strides forward in the single financial market in recent years, national banking systems remained very distinct, complicating the negotiations on both the revised DGS directive the EDIS and ensuring the persistence of national variation. 
